Author: Gordan Bosanac
It would be misleading to say that the idea of EU membership was dominant from the very beginning of Croatian independence. The process of Croatia’s democratization which started in 1990 was soon marked and checked by preparations for war and then war itself. War is probably the worst case scenario in which to change a country’s government.
What is often highlighted from that period is the difference in electoral posters from the first democratic elections in Croatia and Slovenia. While the slogan “Europa zdaj!“ (Europe now) dominated Slovenia, Croatia was plastered over with posters of the C roatian Democratic Union (HDZ) with the slogan “Svoj na svom“ (Our people on our land). One of the most important clauses in the then adopted Constitution (which is still in force today) prohibits Croatia’s entry into any sort of alliance that could lead to re-instituting Yugoslavia or any similar community of peoples. Even if the EU was being contemplated back then, the vision did not include former countries of Yugoslavia. The end of war in 1995 did not lead to democratization. On the contrary, Croatia found itself in increasing international isolation, and the international community was often being portrayed as an “enemy of the Croatian people” quick to criticize the quality of human rights protection and the country’s democratization in general. The death of Franjo Tuđman in December 1999 as well as the end of a decade-long rule of HDZ slowly marked the beginning of the country’s democratization and a firm expression of its desire to join the EU. In the first ten years of its independence, Croatia had missed the opportunity to clearly state its position when it comes to EU membership.
From 2001, the EU became a strategic national interest articulated in a number of key national documents and a broader consensus over Croatia’s accession to the EU started building up among all parties in the parliament. In December 2001, the Croatian Parliament ratified the Stabilization and Association Agreement which was, in a way, the formal start of the accession process. At the same time, constructive criticism of the EU was non-existent, especially in the light of the fact that many formerly communist countries were joining the Union. The EU became the final destination.
In February 2003, Croatia applied for EU membership and was made a candidate country in June 2004. This was also the beginning of intense pressure for Croatia to prove its full cooperation with the international community and meet its only criterion: to arrest general Ante Gotovina, indicted by the International Court of Justice in Hague. It became clear that the EU would for the most part adopt a “carrots and sticks” approach to negotiating with Croatia. This kind of approach caused an ever greater resistance of pro-nationalist citizens towards the EU, but the consensus over EU accession never waned among the political parties. HDZ was back in power, led by Ivo Sanader who imposed himself to the international community as a modern conservative European politician who respected the rights of minorities. From today’s perspective it becomes clear that only the party close to the right-oriented electorate could pull off unpopular moves upsetting to the conservatives. A left party would immediately be branded as “communist” and such moves would primarily be used by other political parties to remove them from government. Entry negotiations with the EU began in December 2005 – the start of the most intense part of EU accession.
Croatia was the first country to join the EU under the new acquis which was now divided into 35 chapters. At the beginning of the process, the government included a large number of citizens in the screening of acquis chapters, but soon after the negotiation process became reserved for a chosen few. Negotiations were proclaimed to be secret, working groups in charge of the process became reduced, and the public was only sporadically informed on the course of negotiations. This decision led to an extreme simplification of certain issues being negotiated, resulting in rumors that markets will no longer sell cheese and cream and that brandy brewing and pig slaughtering will be banned. And so the EU story boiled down to cheese and cream, pork chops and brandy. Also, it soon became clear that the word “negotiations” did not accurately describe what was actually happening. This was about adjusting to EU standards, and the maneuvering space for negotiation exemption from certain standards was very small.
At first, the public did not show much interest in knowing how this process of negotiation-adjustment was progressing. It was believed things were taking their natural course. The desire to join the Union was still strong, so there was little interest for the particularities of the negotiations. Concurrently, the negotiation process had put enormous strain on the public administration which had to comply with numerous reforms and adopt a number of laws. The Parliament used special legislative procedures, skipping the customary two readings of bills in Parliament. More than 80% of laws per year were passed in this way. As for the way in which the negotiation process affected the everyday lives of citizens, it was mostly evidently in better human rights protection. From fighting discrimination, the government’s determination to protect the always controversial (on the Balkans) LGBT pride parade, to actively solving the problems of repatriates. Improvements were evident in all of these segments.
After five years, 2009 revealed a visible tiredness when it came to the negotiation process. Furthermore, the financial crisis engulfed Croatia and brought its economy to the brink of collapse. Unemployment rates soared and citizens started realizing that the numerous reforms their country was making as part of its negotiation process in no way enhanced their lives from an economic point of view. On the contrary, market liberalization and decreased working rights protection sparked more constructive criticism of the accession process. While the process had a beneficial effect for human rights and the country’s democratization, results in the economic sphere were missing. Simultaneously, some of the EU member countries found themselves in the thick of the economic crisis, and human rights protection within the EU increasingly deteriorated which only exacerbated the skepticism of Croatian citizens towards the EU. Hiding the negotiations away from the public left us ignorant as to how EU membership will affect our lives, apart from the usual soundbites of being able to travel across the EU with nothing but an ID and having the opportunity to study in the EU for cut down prices.
The end of the negotiation process was marked by major disturbances. EU’s favorite politician Ivo Sanader resigned as prime minister, and several months later was trialed for corruption. The fight against corruption became the most important political issue and the incarceration of the formerly untouchable and charismatic prime minister Sanader was frequently interpreted in the context of the near completion of EU negotiations. The Republic of Croatia formally ended its negotiations on 30 June, 2011, two decades after proclaiming independence. The last chapter, which took a long time to close, was chapter 23.
In January 2011, a referendum on Croatia’s EU membership took place. A somewhat reversed order of things. Instead of the process beginning with the referendum, it closed with one. The turnout for the referendum was 43, 5 %, with 66 % voting for and 34 % voting against EU accession. The referendum was followed by the ratification of the Treaty of Accession which the EU and Croatia had signed, and on 1 July 2013 Croatia became a full member of the EU. A year after Croatia’s accession, there are no significant changes for the better. In fact, numbers show that the economy is in constant decline, and in the first year of its membership, Croatia saw two civil initiatives that managed to collect enough signatures for two referendums aiming to curtail minority rights in Croatia to take place (the rights of the LGBT population and the rights of national – primarily Serbian – minorities). Furthermore, one of the referendums was a success. This is clear indication that the numerous reforms Croatia had to carry out in order to join the Union remain only on paper and that their true implementation is far off.