By: Adnan Huskić
Originally published in: Perspectives;
Publisher: Heinrich Böll Foundation
On 1 June 2015, Bosnia and Herzegovina entered into a contractual relation with the EU, following the decision by the European Council on entry into force of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the EU countries and BH. The Agreement was already ratified by all member states in late 2008, but it did not enter into force due to a clear (that was the wisdom of the day at least) violation of the European Convention of Human Rights in the case of Sejdić and Finci v BH from 2009. The last country to ratify the SSA on the EU side in 2011 was France, but the Agreement still did not enter into force, as the EU considered it unwise to open a new legal conundrum that nobody really wanted to deal with at the time.
In short, the SAA was put on ice because if it had not been, Bosnia would be the first country to have violated the Agreement as soon as it entered into force. So, until the constitutional reform aimed at removing discriminatory provisions was implemented, the Bosnian SAA was put on hold.
Fast forward to 2015, and, with the same Constitution that (still) discriminates based on ethnicity, the SAA enters into force. This decision was made as a reward and an incentive for Bosnian political stakeholders, all of whom have put their signatures under the list of things to be done that had been prepared by the BH Presidency in accordance with the input from the EU. The BH Presidency, the three governments (state and both entities), and all the relevant political parties signed and committed themselves to undertake a set of socio-economic reform measures (vaguely defined in the Presidency paper). In short, Bosnian authorities have been paid in advance for not doing anything at all in any measurable or meaningful way.
BH elites afraid of the EU
The slightly farcical tone of the whole thing was offset by the real reasons for the apparent shift in the attitude of the EU towards BH. It appears that the EU is much more concerned with the wellbeing of Bosnian citizens, as became clear during the social unrest from February 2014, but also when in May the same year floods brought the country to its knees after the governments (all of them) proved absolutely incapable of disaster management, or, for that matter, any kind of management. Once again, the EU reached out to Bosnia rather than vice versa, frustrated by the virtual absence of any progress and by changing not the substance of conditionality but its framework. In short, Bosnia has graduated to become the subject of political, rather than technical, accession.
For quite a long time, the EU and the bulk of international actors in Bosnia operated under the assumption that has been proven valid time and again by a simple opinion polling procedure. Support for the EU integration of the country never fell below 75%. There have always been slight-to-more-pronounced differences among the two entities when it comes to supporting the country’s bid to join the EU, but the general support remained rather high (2009 – 89.9%, 2012 – 76%, 2013 – 80%, 2014 – 85%*). Contrary to the “obvious” desire of the population, their political elites seemed to have favoured other issues over the EU integration when it came to their political practice. In all honesty, when asked, all politicians, without exception, are strongly supportive of Bosnia’s bid for accession to the EU, but when it comes to making any meaningful practical steps in this direction, their determination somehow seems to lose steam. So much so that over the course of nearly a decade of failures to meet even the least sensitive political requirements, the EU and its western allies in Bosnia came to the conclusion that most local analysts were saying all along – Bosnia’s political elites are just not interested in the country’s integration into the EU.
Be it for the lack of incentive to bring the country closer, seeing as, financially and with their lavish lifestyles, they themselves already are part of an affluent western society, or (and frequently stated as the most prominent reason) because the more advanced the country is on its path towards the EU, the more pressure mounts to establish a relatively functioning and independent judicial system and rule of law. It is the latter reason that causes terror among the ranks of the noveau riche political and transitional elites in Bosnia, for they have seen the results of this process in Croatia and they do not want to see that happening here.
In a nutshell, Bosnian citizens are perceived as being hostage to their own political misfortunes and power-hungry and greedy political elites. In this narrative, citizens of Bosnia are largely absolved of any responsibility for the wrongdoings of their elites, except for a small detail that seems to confuse just about everybody – their repetitive voting patterns. This one small detail was hard for the outsiders to grasp: if so many citizens are dissatisfied with the political elites in Bosnia, why do they keep electing the same people to office? The same people who refuse to bring them closer to the EU, which is what the majority clearly wants.
Politically controlled society in the captured state
In order to decipher this particular phenomenon, one needs to take a closer look at how the Bosnian political and economic system works. Bosnia is perhaps the most prominent example of a captured state in today’s world. The level of state capture by political parties, or rather a handful of selected people, is simply stunning. Not only they control the commanding heights of the economy and politics, but their reach stretches literally to the level of elementary schools as far as appointments and interventions are concerned. They micromanage to an unprecedented level.
The true volume of political control over the public domain is actually well known. According to one report** by a Bosnian watchdog organization, the Centre for Civic Initiatives (CCI), the number of political appointments in BH hovers around 25,000, which is well above the official number of some 6,000. These numbers, however, pertain only to the public administration. Every single day, public enterprises or enterprises where the state owns the majority of shares sink deeper into insolvency under the burden of the irrational and rampant party-based employment policy. Only in the Sarajevo Canton, debts incurred by dysfunctional and ridiculously overstaffed public enterprises amount to roughly 80 million KM (€40 million) a year. Just to illustrate this, the public transportation enterprise in Sarajevo, which is state-owned and consequently party-controlled, has got a total number of 1,700 employees out of which 300-400 are excess employees, according to conservative estimates, all the way up to 1,000 excess workers according to the former minister of transportation.***
Through rather non-transparent public procurement procedures, which consume some 4 billion KM (€2 billion) a year, parties exercise control over the bulk of the private sector in BH, spreading their area of influence and their clientelistic networks to unimaginable levels. Budget deficits are soaring and IMF loans are used to cover current expenditures. But the political elites of the country find this situation acceptable, as long as they can provide for their own. Their own clientele. Be that oversized public administration, privileged pensioners or quasi-social categories such as war veterans, the political elites are fine as long as these categories are left untouched.
Internalisation of reforms
The notion of reforms has all but lost its meaning in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For decades, the reform processes were driven by foreign actors and more often than not against the explicit will of Bosnia’s political elites. This time, Bosnian political elites have committed themselves to undertake necessary (painful) reforms aimed at reducing public spending, increasing competitiveness, providing a better entrepreneurial environment, all of which will indirectly result with the dismantling of the system of excessive political control, crony capitalism and widespread networks of patronage. To motivate them even further, the so much needed financial aid and loans from abroad have all become conditional upon all the previously mentioned measures being introduced.
After all the attempts by Bosnian politicians to secure the money (from alternative sources) necessary to fill the gaping budget holes and keep the clientele happy have failed miserably (Republika Srpska sought favourable loans in Russia, and the Federation of BH in Turkey), the first step in the reform process came on the agenda in July 2015 in the form of the Labour Law reform. Both the opposition, which previously signed the same Reform Agenda, and unions (which still operate using terms of the XIX century class struggle vernacular and represent first and foremost beneficiaries of the budget) have rallied in public against the Law. Politicians began pointing fingers at the EU (in a similar fashion to their western counterparts, who blame Brussels for just about any unpopular measure). Unions too have been very critical of the EU, castigating local politicians for working in the interests of the EU. Social media were ablaze, describing the situation as a gargantuan struggle between worker and the Goliath of global capitalism embodied in the EU. Voices of reason pointing to the disastrous economic situation and the necessity to change things were few and far between. And all this in a country where an average of 80% of citizens support the country’s bid to join the EU.
Now, this situation is about to get much worse, for the next item on the agenda is the reform of the Pension law. And all these laws will severely affect especially the political parties’ clientele. As a result, the EU will increasingly be portrayed as the main culprit for the painful reforms inflicted on Bosnian citizens as a whole. Just a handful will blame our own political elites for a decade of economic and social mismanagement. Just a handful seems ready to acknowledge the fact that it is us and our political elites that are to blame for the fact that the Bosnian economy has been spiralling downwards for nearly a decade now. Reforms do not just happen to a country, an abstract entity that we largely have nothing to do with. In order to get closer to the EU, we need to internalize norms and rules and we need to change.
Bosnian citizens and their political elites were so absorbed by an unproductive and futile political debate on raison d’état and the constitutional reform to even be able to seriously consider all implications of the country’s accession to the EU. When asked about the biggest advantage of becoming an EU member, most respondents (40%) have stated more jobs, 20% mentioned peace and security, while only 7% said that they see no advantage for Bosnia in joining the EU.**** How will this support change now that the years of innocence have passed and the reality kicks in? Bosnia and Herzegovina and its citizens have long been living in a state of widespread irresponsibility where neither our politicians were willing to make the necessary and decisive break with the practices of the past, nor were we as citizens willing to share that burden. What citizens of Bosnia obviously want is to become a member of the EU. At the same time, they do not really want to change anything substantially. And only now are we beginning to realize that this is not going to work.
So let’s ask ourselves once again, do we support our country’s bid to join the EU, now that we know what it really means?
*Poll results published by the Directorate for European Integrations.
** „Policies, procedure and practice of appointment and employment in public administration in BH“ (“Politike, procedure i prakse imenovanja zapošljavanja u organima javne uprave u BiH”), August 2014 (http://www.cci.ba/download/docs/drzava_ba_POLICY_BRIEF.pdf/03534e7f25e7726ef947d1de0df7589c).
*** http://www.bljesak.info/rubrika/business/clanak/bubica-ponudena-pomoc-u-prijevozu-iz-svih-vecih-gradova-bih/16469
**** DEI survey, 2013.